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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Dennis Fernandez,

:
Defendant/Appellant

:

v.

:

Ogden City,

:
Plaintiff/ Appellee.

Appellate Case No. 20050105 -CA

Priority No.: 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. 77-18a-l
andU.CA. 78-2a-3(e) (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether Utah's statutory scheme governing the jurisdiction of District
Courts and Justice Courts violates a Defendant's Equal Protection Rights pursuant to
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. In the present case whether the filing of the Defendant's case
which involved only Class B Misdemeanors or less in the Second District Court rather
than the Weber County Justice Court violated the Defendant's Equal Protection Rights.

Standard of Review: "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of
law, which we review for correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,f 5,
86P.3d735

Issue 2: Whether the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure eliminating the right to a jury trial in the case of
an Infraction violate the Utah State Constitution and its guarantee of a criminal
defendant's right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions. In the present case whether the
court erred in denying the Defendant's Renewed Demand for Jury Trial and proceeding
with a Bench Trial despite the Defendant's request for Jury Trial.
Standard of Review: "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of
law, which we review for correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,| 5,
86 P.3d 735

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL: Counsel for the Defendant raised
the above stated issues in the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Renewed Demand for
Jury Trial, both of which were filed with the Second District Court prior to the Bench
Trial in this matter on January 7, 2005, and subsequently denied by the trial court, Judge
Ernie Jones. (See attached copies of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Renewed
Demand for Jury Trial)
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
a) Constitutional Provisions:
Utah State Constitution-Article 1, Section 12
Utah State Constitution- Article I, Section 24
United States Constituion-l^ Amendment
b) Statutes:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-25-2
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-103
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-104
c) Rules:
Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
In this appeal, the Appellant seeks a reversal of order of the Second District Court,
entered on January 7, 2005, denying the Defendant's Renewed Demand for Jury Trial
and Motion to Dismiss/Transfer, and his subsequent convictions for Simple Assault and
Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child entered following the Bench Trial on
January 7, 2005. It is the position of the Defendant that the trial court erred in denying
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/Transfer in that the proper court in which to file the

Defendant's case was the Weber Count Justice Court and not the Second District Court.
Further, it is also the position of the defendant that he has a constitutional right to a Jury
Trial under the Utah State Constitution and that the court erred and violated that right by
denying his Renewed Demand for Jury Trial and proceeding with a bench trial instead.

Course of Proceedings Below:
The Defendant was arrested at approximately 1:30 a.m. on May 10, 2004. He was
later released from jail on May 11, 2004, after posting bond. The Defendant was
originally charged on May 10, 2004, by Formal Information filed by the Ogden City
Prosecutor's Office, with 1 count of Simple Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, 1 count of
Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a Class B Misdemeanor, and 1 count of
Intoxication, a Class C Misdemeanor. At the Pre-trial Conference in this matter, this case
was set for a Jury Trial on January 7, 2005. On January 5th, 2005, the Ogden City
Prosecutor, filed an Amended Information amending all 3 counts to Infractions and
requested that the court strike the jury trial set for January 7, 2004, and hold a bench trial
instead. Prior to the bench trial the Defendant filed a Renewed Demand for Jury Trial
asking that the court proceed with the Jury Trial as scheduled and a Motion to
Dismiss/Transfer. The court denied both of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/Transfer
and Renewed Demand for Jury Trial and proceeded with a Bench Trial on January 7,
2005. At the conclusion of the Bench Trial, the court found the Defendant guilty of
Simple Assault and Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, both Infractions as
4

amended.

SUMMARY OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE ON APPEAL
Because this appeal involves only challenges to the constitutionality of the statutes
or rules involved, this court's determination would not be aided by the facts presented at
trial as the motions made and argued were not based on any facts presented at trial. As
such, the Defendant has not requested that a transcript be prepared in this case.
However, the Defendant does point out the fact that the Defendant was arrested
and taken to the Weber County Jail on May 10, 2004. That he was held in custody on the
charges involved here until May 11, 2004, at which time he was able to secure his release
by posting bail.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
It is the position of the Appellant that the proper venue for this case would have
been the Weber County Justice Court and that the District Court Judge erred in denying
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/Transfer his case to the Weber County Justice Court
which had the authority pursuant to Utah Law to exercise jurisdiction in this case. It is
also the Defendant's position that Utah's statutory scheme of jurisdiction of Justice
Court's and District Court's as currently being applied in several jurisdictions in Utah,
including Ogden, violates the Defendant's Equal Protection Rights pursuant to Article I,
Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Odgen like several other cities in Utah have not established Justice
5

Court's of their own and instead are filing cases involving Class B Misdemeanors or less
in their local District Courts rather than the Justice Court in their county. As such,
Defendants who are charged with the same crime are having their cases filed in different
"courts" where they enjoy substantially varying rights of appellate or de novo review
based solely on the location of their arrest and whether the case originated in a Justice
Court or District Court.
It is also the Defendant's position that the court violated the Defendant's
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial guaranteed by the Utah State Constitution when it
denied his Renewed Demand for a Jury Trial and proceeded with a bench trial and that
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
unconstitutionally seek to eliminate the right to a jury trial in the case of an Infraction.

ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME OF JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE
COURTS AND DISTRICT COURTS AS APPLIED VIOLATED THE
DEFENDANT'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS

It is the position of the Defendant that although the District Courts in the State of
Utah have jurisdiction to hear cases involving offenses classified as Class B or Class C
Misdemeanors and infractions, the proper court in which to file the above entitled case
was the Weber County Justice Court.
Pursuant to Utah's statutory scheme of District and Justice Courts, cases involving
offenses classified as class B Misdemeanors or less are to be filed in the Justice Courts.
6

Utah Code § 77-25-2 states that "Any prosecution by information, except in the case of a
felony or class A Misdemeanor, shall be commenced before a magistrate in the precinct
of the county or municipality where the offense was alleged to have been committed,
except as otherwise provided by law." (emphasis added) Furthermore, Utah Code § 785-104 states that "(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors,
violation of ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction,
except those offense over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction." (emphasis
added) Clearly a justice court would have original jurisdiction to hear this case because
the offenses alleged in this case were originally filed as Class B and C misdemeanors (All
charges have since been amended to Infractions pursuant to the amended Information
filed on January 5, 2005, by the Ogden City Prosecutor's Office) and therefore fall under
the jurisdiction of the justice courts as set forth in Utah Code § 78-5-104 and pursuant to
Utah Code § 77-25-2 the case should be filed in a justice court.
Although the City of Ogden has not established a justice court, there is available a
justice court with proper jurisdiction to hear this case. Utah Code § 78-5-103 defines the
territorial jurisdiction of the justice courts as follows: "(1) The territorial jurisdiction of
county justice courts extends to the limits of the precinct for which the justice court is
created and includes all cities or towns within the precinct, except cities where a
municipal justice court exists, "(emphasis added) Pursuant to this statute, the jurisdiction
of the Weber County Justice court extends to all cities or towns in Weber County,
including Ogden, and since Ogden has not established a municipal justice court, the
7

Weber County Justice Court maintains its jurisdiction over misdemeanors cases, Class B
or less, alleged to have been committed in Ogden City.
The statutory scheme of jurisdiction of the justice courts and district courts as
outlined above and the difference in the appellate rights extended to Defendants whose
cases begin in Justice Courts versus the appellate rights extended to criminal Defendants
whose cases begin in the District Court violates both Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution states: "All laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const, art. I, § 24. The Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from enacting laws that
deny "any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const,
amend. XIV, § 1. "despite their dissimilar language, these two constitutional provisions
'embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same." Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002)(citations
omitted)(emphasis added).
Under Utah law a defendant tried in a Justice Court has different appellate rights
than a defendant tried in a District Court. The right of appeal from a Justice Court
conviction is limited to a Trial de Novo in the district court unless the Defendant is
challenging the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. Whereas, the right to appeal
from a conviction in district court does not allow the Defendant to relitigate the facts of
8

the case but does allow the Defendant to have his case reviewed by the Utah Court of
Appeals or Utah Supreme Court based on the record established the district court. There
are some benefits and disadvantages of both scenarios. For a Defendant in Justice Court,
he gets a second chance to relitigate the facts of his case on appeal to the District Court
"de novo." However, this also means that a prosecutor who presents a case poorly in
justice court also has an opportunity to relitigate the facts at a hearing de novo after
having had a chance to preview the Defendant's case and his defense in the Justice Court.
Likewise, a Defendant in Justice Court does not have an effective and efficient
opportunity to appeal his case to a true appellate court in order to get a ruling on the
interpretation of a statute since his ability to appeal to the appellate courts is limited only
to situations where he is challenging the overall constitutionality of the statute. To the
contrary, a Defendant whose case is filed in District Court only gets one bite at the apple
so to speak since he does not have the ability to relitigate the facts of his case or to have a
second jury trial like a Defendant whose case starts in Justice Court, goes to trial is
convicted and appeals to District where he is allowed a second trial "de novo." But the
Defendant in District court does have a way to efficiently and effectively appeal to the
appellate courts on any issue appropriate for review not just the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance.
Clearly there are some vast differences in the rights of Defendants whose cases are
filed in the Justice Court versus those whose cases are filed in District, particularly their
"appellate right" as outlined above. This is particularly troublesome in city's such as
9

Ogden, Orem, and Layton where the cities have not established their own justice courts
therefore cases involving only Class B Misdemeanors or less are being filed in their local
District Courts, such was the case here, subjecting those defendants to different rights
from others who commit similar offense in cities who have established their own justice
courts.
Thus, under the current statutory scheme and the manner in which it is being
applied in cities such as Ogden, Orem and Layton, a Defendant's "right to appeal" is
effectively being determined by the location of his arrest and whether or not the
municipality in which the offense occurred has established a justice court. The current
statutory scheme in Utah provides that cases involving Class B misdemeanors or less
should be filed in a Justice Court. However, in cases where the offense is committed in a
municipality which has not established a justice court, the district court sitting in that
municipality maintains jurisdiction to hear the case even if it involves only a Class B
Misdemeanor offense. For example, under the current statutory scheme, a Utah citizen
who commits an a offense of Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, within the city limits of
Salt Lake City would have his case filed in the Salt Lake City Justice Court, and if
convicted would have a right to a Trial de Novo in the Third District Court. However, as
was done in this case, a Utah citizen who commits an offense of Assault, a Class B
Misdemeanor, in Ogden, which has not established a municipal justice court, would have
his case filed in the Second District Court, and would not have a right to a Trial de Novo
but rather would be entitled to appeal his case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
10

As such, this statutory scheme as it was applied in this case violated the
Defendant's Constitutional Rights pursuant to Article I, Section 24 of the Utah State
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that it
treats "similarly situated" Utah citizens differently based entirely on the location of where
their offense was committed.

IL

THE DEFENDANT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DENIED HIS
RIGHT UNDER THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION TO A TRIAL
BYJURY

In recent years the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the Utah State Constitution
to provide criminal defendants with more expansive protections than those guaranteed by
the United States Constitution. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), State v.
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990)(the Utah Supreme Court conducted an analysis of the
Defendant's double jeopardy argument solely under the Utah State Constitution), State v.
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991)(ruling that under Utah State Constitution a person
has an expectation of privacy in bank records held by a third party), and Sims v.
Collection Division of Utah State Tax Comm's, 841 P.2d 6 (Utah 1992)(court struck
down a suspicionless investigatory roadblock and applied exclusionary rule ruling that
illegal obtained evidence could not be used in quasi-criminal cases).
More recently, in its ruling in the case of Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, 519
Utah Adv. Rep H^he court criticized defense attorney's failures to raise state
11

constitutional arguments and invited attorneys to raise state constitutional arguments
implying that they had a duty to do so.
The reluctance of litigants to take up and develop a state
constitutional analysis is surprising in light of our repeated
statements that federal Fourth Amendment protections may differ
from those guaranteed our citizens by our state constitution. See,
e.g., State v. DeBoov, 2000 UT 32, f 12. 996 P.2d 546 ("While this
court's interpretation of article I, section 14 has often paralleled the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, we have stated that we will not hesitate to give the
Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will more
appropriately protect the rights of this state's citizens.'1); State v.
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n. 8 (Utah 1988) ("[CJhoosing to give
the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove
to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth
amendment by the federal courts."); State v. Hvgh, 711 P.2d 264,
271-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (stating that state
and federal search and seizure law are not identical).
In Brake, for example, we took issue with the usefulness of
federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the police
officer safety justification for warrantless automobile searches.
Brake, 2004 UT 95 at ^fff 27-31, 103 P.3d 699. Our reasoning in
Brake emanated to a great extent from cases in which we concluded
that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides a greater
expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court.
Where the parties do not raise or adequately brief state
constitutional issues, our holdings become inevitably contingent.
They carry within them an implicit qualification that if properly
invited to intervene, our state's Declaration of Rights might change
the result and impose different demands on police officers and
others who in a very real sense are the everyday guardians of
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
In the not so distant history of this court, we engaged in an
ongoing and robust discussion over whether and to what extent we
should defer to the federal courts when called upon to interpret
provisions of our Declaration of Rights, which parallel the federal
Bill of Rights. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1234-42 (Utah
12

1996); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534-36 (Utah 1994); State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990).
Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, 519 Utah Adv. Rep 17, f 10-13.
In the spirit of the invitation extended by the Supreme Court in Stuart, the
Defendant asks this court to undertake an analysis of a Defendant's right to a trial by jury
under the Utah State Constitution. The Defendant urges this court to evaluate a
Defendant's right to a jury trial not simply based on the level of punishment or
imprisonment which may be imposed, as the Federal Courts have done, but rather based
on the nature of the charges against the Defendant and the resulting impingements on a
Defendant's rights and freedoms as a result of his arrest. Furthermore, the Defendant
urges this court to find that the Defendant in this case was entitled to a trial by jury.
The Utah State Constitution Guarantees a Criminal Defendant a Right to a
Jury Trial in All "Criminal Prosecutions"
It is a well settled principle of law that although a state constitution cannot strip a
citizen of the constitutional protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution, a
state constitution can provide for additional protections not included in the United States
Constitution. With regard to the right to a jury trial, it is the position of the Defendant
that the Utah State Constitution provides a criminal Defendant even more protection than
the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution
unambiguously provides that "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right..
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. to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed . . . " Const Art. 1, § 12. (emphasis added)
In this case, Despite having amended the charges against Mr. Fernandez from
Misdemeanors to Infractions, the City continued the "criminal prosecution" of Mr.
Fernandez for allegedly violating several "criminal statutes". By amending the charges
to Infractions the City sought to strip Mr. Fernandez of his constitutional right to have his
case decided by a jury of his peers. Pursuant to Utah Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Defendant properly demanded a trial by jury and insisted that his
constitutional right to a jury trial pursuant to Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution be enforced.

Utah Code Ann, $ 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure Violate Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution

In direct contradiction to Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution, Utah
Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) provides that "No person shall be convicted unless by verdict
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon judgment by a magistrate."
(emphasis added) Likewise, Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states
that "(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written
demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be
allowed in the trial of an infraction." (emphasis added) These provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure eliminating
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the right to a jury trial in the case of an Infraction violate the Utah State Constitution and
its guarantee of a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure attempt to eliminate the requirement of a jury trial in the case of an Infraction.
However, all of the remaining rights enumerated in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
State Constitution, including "the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf and "the
right to appeal in all cases" are extended to a Defendant charged with an Infraction. The
only one of the rights set forth in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution that
the legislature and now the City have impermissibly attempted to take away is the right to
a jury trial. This Court should resist any argument to do so based on the clear and
unambiguous expression of the Utah State Constitution assuring a right to a jury trial in
all criminal prosecutions.

At the time of the Bench Trial the Defendant in this case Still Remained the
Subject of a Criminal Prosecution and was therefore Entitled to a Jury Trial
Pursuant to Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution
In the present case, the Defendant was charged with several "crimes." Each of the
offenses or statutes which he was alleged to have violated are found in the 'Utah
Criminal Code." During the course of the case the prosecution maintained the charges as
15

Misdemeanor offenses until the verge of trial. The Defendant had properly demanded a
trial by jury pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) and the case had been set for a
jury trial on January 7, 2005. The Defendant had chosen to have his case tried to a jury at
which time it would have been the prosecution's burden to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and the unanimous verdict of the jury would have been required to
convict him. The prosecutor continued to proceed with the charges as misdemeanors
until two days before the jury trial, when on January 5, 2005, the prosecutor filed an
Amended Information reducing the charges to misdemeanors and requested that the court
strike the jury trial and proceed with a bench trial.

This amending of the charges is a

poorly veiled effort by the prosecution to strip the Defendant of his right to have his case
decided by a jury of his peers.
Despite the prosecution's motion to amend the charges in this case from Class B
and C Misdemeanors to Infractions the Defendant still remained the subject of a criminal
prosecution. To this day the arrest still appears on his criminal history and he was still
subject to penalties for violating a criminal statute. The prosecution's motion to amend
the charge in this case from misdemeanors to infractions did not change the criminal
nature of the charges and therefore all of the rights of the criminally accused enumerated
in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution applied to the Defendant, including
the right to a trial by jury.
To further support the Defendant's position that he was still the subject to a
criminal prosecution and that he was entitled to a jury trial, the Defendant points out the
16

fact that on the night of the alleged incident, he was arrested, placed in handcuffs, and
incarcerated at the Weber County Jail. The Defendant was later released after posting
bond. As such, as a result of this alleged offense the Defendant's freedom was curtailed
to a degree associated with a "criminal" offense as he was arrested and jailed. Under
normal circumstances, a person suspected of committing an Infraction level offense is
simply given a citation and upon signing a promise to appear they are allowed to go on
their way.
In light of all of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is absurd to say that
the amending of the charges to Infractions magically changed this from criminal case to
something different. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, it is obvious that the
amending of the charges to Infractions does not change the fact that the defendant had
been arrested, jailed, and charged with several crimes, all of which are reflective of and
associated with a "criminal prosecution."

CONCLUSION
As such, it is the position of the Defendant that the District Court lacked proper
jurisdiction to hear this case. That the statutory scheme of jurisdiction of the Justice
Courts and District Courts as applied in this case violated the Defendant's Equal
Protection Rights under both the Utah Constitution and United States Constitution.
Further, it is the position of the Defendant that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-16(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure eliminating the right to a
17

trial by jury in the case of an Infraction are unconstitutional and that he was guaranteed
the right to a trial by jury in this case by the Utah State Constitution.
Therefore the Defendant moves this court to enter an order vacating the
Defendant's convictions entered following the Bench Trial on January 5, 2005.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The Appellant requests oral argument in this matter pursuant to Rule 29(a) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is a matter raises several important
constitutional issues and it is the position of the Appellant that the court could be
significantly aided in its decision process by oral argument from the parties.
DATED this day, August 18, 2005.

Jason/Schatz
Attgrney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this August 18,2005,1 personally mailed true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following:

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Appellate Clerks Office
450 South State, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210
Paul Olds
OGDEN CITY ATTORNEY
2525 Grant Ave., 1st Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
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ADDENDA

Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
emand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
) be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
itnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
te offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
xused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
iaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled
> testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
Le same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination is
mited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
mstitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at
ly preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of
e defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
o History for Constitution
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Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
No History for Constitution
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U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and
Equal Protection

Amendment Text | Annotations
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of
i State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
•educed in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number
)f male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
/ice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
vho, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United
>tates, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State,
o support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
.gainst the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of
wo-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
lection. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts
[lcurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
ebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay
ny debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
laim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be
eld illegal and void.
ection. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
lis article.
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77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is alleged to have
:>een committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 days after
irraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a
uidgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
lagistrate.
Enacted by Chapter 15,1980 General Session
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77-25-2. Venue of prosecution by information.
Any prosecution by information, except in the case of a felony or class A misdemeanor, shall be commenced
^fore a magistrate in the precinct of the county or municipality where the offense was alleged to have been
3mmitted, except as otherwise provided by law.
nacted by Chapter 15, 1980 General Session
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78-5-103. Territorial jurisdiction -- Voting.
(1) The territorial jurisdiction of county justice courts extends to the limits of the precinct for which the
justice court is created and includes all cities or towns within the precinct, except cities where a municipal
justice court exists.
(2) The territorial jurisdiction of municipal justice courts extends to the corporate limits of the municipality
in which the justice court is created.
(3) The territorial jurisdiction of county and municipal justice courts functioning as magistrates extends
beyond the boundaries in Subsections (1) and (2):
(a) as set forth in Section 78-7-17.5; and
(b) to the extent necessary to carry out magisterial functions under Subsection 77-7-23(2) regarding jailed
persons.
(4) For election of county justice court judges, all registered voters in the county justice court precinct may
/ote at the judge's retention election.
\mended by Chapter 21,1999 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78J)A005.ZIP 2,128 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|All TitleslLegislative Home Page
ast revised: Thursday, July 28, 2005

k

&'

78-5-104. Jurisdiction.
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and
ifractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those offenses over which the juvenile court
as exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78, Chapter 6, Small Claims Courts, if
le defendant resides in or the debt arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice court.
.mended by Chapter 215,1997 General Session
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Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel The defendant shall be
personally present at the tnal with the following exceptions
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence,
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the
same effect as if defendant had been present, and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or
obstreperous conduct
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody,
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody,
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance, and
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court and the
consent of the prosecution
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the
court orders otherwise No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U C A 1953
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in
writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less than
otherwise required
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following order
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated,
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may make an opening statement or reserve it
until the prosecution has rested,
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge,
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case,
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits,
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury, and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument The court may set
reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed
using the alternate juror If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors
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remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered.
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a witness as provided in this section.
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the
impartial finder of fact and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question from a juror and may
discontinue questions from jurors at any time.
(2) if the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the jurors that they may write the question as it
occurs to them and submit the question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the jurors that some
questions might not be allowed.
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the question. The
judge may disallow a question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question in the court file.
If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The question
may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the
juror's question.
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an
officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be
sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to
do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified
time.
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by
the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by,
any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is
finally submitted to them.
(I) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been
received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as
exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are
entitled to take notes during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking and using notes.
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an
officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court, the
officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the
state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be
brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or
advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion
respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response
thereto shall be entered in the record.
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the
jury may be sent out again.
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Jason Schatz (Bar #9969)
Schatz & Anderson, LLC
Attorneys for Defendant
356 E. 900 S.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Phone (801) 746-0447
Fax (801) 579-0606

SECOND DISTRICT COURT COURT,
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OGDEN CITY,

:
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS/TRANSFER

:

v.

:

CASE NO. 041905235

Dennis Fernandez,

:

JUDGE JONES

Defendant.

:

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Dennis Fernandez, by and through his attorney, Jason
Schatz, and hereby moves this court to dismiss the above entitled case in this court or in the
alternative to transfer this case to the Weber County Justice Court. Defendant's motion is based
on the following:

It is the position of the Defendant that although the District Courts in the State of Utah
have jurisdiction to hear cases involving offenses classified as Class B or Class C Misdemeanors
and infractions, the proper court in which to file the above entitled case is the Weber County
Justice Court. Pursuant to Utah's statutory scheme of District and Justice Courts, cases

involving offenses classified as class B Misdemeanors or less are to be filed in the Justice
Courts. Utah Code § 77-25-2 states that "Any prosecution by information, except in the case of
a felony or class A Misdemeanor, shall be commenced before a magistrate in the precinct of the
county or municipality where the offense was alleged to have been committed, except as
otherwise provided by law." (emphasis added) Furthermore, Utah Code § 78-5-104 states thai
\\) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances,
and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those offense over which
the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction." (emphasis added) Clearly a justice court would
have original jurisdiction to hear this case because the offenses alleged in this case were
originally filed as Class B and C misdemeanors (All charges have since been amended to
Infractions pursuant to the amended Information filed on January 5, 2005, by the Ogden City
Prosecutor's Office) and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the justice courts as set forth in
Utah Code § 78-5-104 and pursuant to Utah Code § 77-25-2 the case should be filed in a justice
court.

Although the City of Ogden has not established a justice court, there is available a justice
court with proper jurisdiction to hear this case. Utah Code § 78-5-103 defines the territorial
jurisdiction of the justice courts as follows: "(1) The territorial jurisdiction of county justice
courts extends to the limits of the precinct for which the justice court is created and includes all
cities or towns within the precinct, except cities where a municipal justice court
exists, "(emphasis added) Pursuant to this statute, the jurisdiction of the Weber County Justice
court extends to all cities in Weber County, including Ogden, and since Ogden has not

established a municipal justice court, the Weber County Justice Court maintains its jurisdiction
over misdemeanors cases, Class B or less, alleged to have been committed in Ogden City.
THEREFORE based on the above, the Defendant respectfully request that the above
entitled case be dismissed in this court or in the alternative that the case be transferred to the
Weber County Justice Court for further proceedings.

DATED this 5 ^ day of January, 2005.

Jason Schatz
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 5^_ day of January, 2005,1 personally mailed and faxed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss/Transfer:
Clerk of the Court
SECOND DISTRICT COURT COURT
2525 Grant Ave.
Ogden, UT 84401
Paul Olds
OGDEN CITY ATTORNEY
2525 Grant Ave., 1st Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
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Jason Schatz (Bar #9969)
Schatz & Anderson, LLC
Attorneys for Defendant
356 E. 900 S.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Phone (801) 746-0447
Fax (801) 579-0606

SECOND DISTRICT COURT COURT,
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OGDEN CITY,

:

RENEWED DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff,
v.

:
CASE #041902564

Dennis Fernandez,

:
Defendant.

:

JUDGE JONES

COMES NOW, the defendant, Dennis Fernandez, by and through his counsel of record,
Jason Schatz, and hereby renews his demand for a jury trial in the above entitled matter.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The Defendant was originally charged on May 10, 2004, by Formal Information filed by
the Ogden City Prosecutor's Office, with 1 count of Simple Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, 1
count of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a Class B Misdemeanor, and 1 count of
Intoxication, a Class C Misdemeanor. At the Pre-trial Conference in this matter held, this matter
was set for a Jury Trial on January 7,2005. On January 5th, 2005, the Ogden City Prosecutor,
filed an Amended Information amending all 3 counts to Infractions.

ARGUMENT
The Defendant now renews his demand for a trial by jury and moves this Court to go
forward with the Jury Trial on the 3 counts charged as Infractions as scheduled on January 7,
2005. Defendant's Renewed Demand for Jury Trial in this matter is based on the following:

The Utah State Constitution Guarantees a Criminal Defendant a Right to a Jury
Trial in All "Criminal Prosecutions"

It is a well settled principle of law that although a state constitution cannot strip a citizen
of the constitutional protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution, a state constitution
can provide for additional protections not included in the United States Constitution. With
regard to the right to a jury trial, it is the position of the Defendant that the Utah State
Constitution provides a criminal Defendant even more protection than the United States
Constitution. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution unambiguously provides that
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right.. .to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed
" Const. Art. 1, $ LZ. (emphasis added)
Despite having amended the charges against Mr. Fernandez from Misdemeanors to
Infractions, the City continues the "criminal prosecution" of Mr. Fernandez for allegedly
violating several "criminal statutes". By Amending the charge to an Infraction the City has
sought to strip Mr. Fernandez of his constitutional right to have his case decided by a jury of his
peers. Pursuant to Utah Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Defendant
hereby demands a trial by jury and insists that his constitutional right to a jury trial pursuant to
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution be enforced.

Utah Code Ann. $ 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rufe 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure Violate Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution

In direct contradiction to Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) provides that "No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or
upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon judgment by a magistrate," (emphasis added)
Likewise, Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "(d) All other cases
shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to
trial, or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.'"
(emphasis added) These provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure eliminating the right to a jury trial in the case of an Infraction
violate the Utah State Constitution and its guarantee of a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial
in all criminal prosecutions.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
attempt to eliminate the requirement of a jury trial in the case of an Infraction. However, all of
the remaining rights enumerated in: Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution, including
"the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses ir
his own behalf and "the right to appeal in all cases" are extended to a Defendant charged with
an Infraction. The only one of the rights set forth in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution that the legislature and now the City have impermissibly attempted to take away is
the right to a jury trial. This Court should resist any argument to do so based on the clear and

unambiguous expression of the Utah State Constitution assuring a right to a jury trial in all
criminal prosecutions.

The Defendant in this case Still Remains the Subject of a Criminal Prosecution and
is therefore Entitled to a Jury Trial Pursuant to Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution
In the present case, the Defendant is currently charged with a "crime" and the Defendant
has decided to exercise his right to a criminal trial in which it will be the prosecution's burden to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The question at issue is whether he will be tried
before a judge or a jury. The Defendant is seeking a jury trial in this matter and has not waived
his right to a jury trial pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e).
Despite the prosecution's motion to amend the charges in this case trom misdemeanors
to infractions the Defendant still remains the subject of a criminal prosecution. The arrest still
appears on his criminal history and he is still subject to penalties for violating a criminal statute.
The prosecution's motion to amend the charge in this case from misdemeanors to infractions
does not change the criminal nature of the charges and therefore all of the rights of the criminally
accused enumerated in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution apply, including the
right to a trial by jury.
To further support the Defendant's position that he is still the subject to a criminal
prosecution in which he is entitled to a jury trial, the Defendant points out the fact that on the
night of the alleged incident, he was arrested, placed in handcuffs, and incarcerated at the Weber
County Jail. The Defendant was later released after posting bond. As such, as a result of this
alleged offense the Defendant's freedom was curtailed to a degree associated with a "criminal"
offense as he was arrested and jailed. Under normal circumstances, a person suspected of

committing an Infraction level offense is simply given a citation and upon signing a promise to
appear they are allowed to go on their way.
CONCLUSION
Arguably, the City's action to amend the charges from Misdemeanors to Infractions,
despite the fact that code sections he is alleged to have violated specifically state that these
violations are Misdemeanors, is nothing more than attempt to deny Mr. Fernandez his right under
the Utah State Constitution to a trial by jury in this case. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §
77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure eliminating the right to a
jury trial in the case of an Infraction are in direct contradiction to the unambiguous and
superseding language of the Utah State Constitution and therefore are unconstitutional.
THEREFORE the Defendant hereby renews his demand for a trial by jury pursuant to
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution. As such, the Defendant moves this court to
proceed with the Jury Trial scheduled on January 7, 2005, on all 3 counts listed above as
Infractions as amended in the Amended Information filed by the Ogden City Prosecutor's Office
on January 5, 2005. The Defendant further moves this court to find that the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure eliminating
the right to a jury trial in the case of an Infraction violate Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution and its guarantee of a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial in criminal
prosecutions.
DATED this J L L day of January, 2005.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the _5

day of January, 5,1 personally faxed and mailed a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Renewed Demand for Jury Trial to the following:

Judge Jones
SECOND DISTRICT COURT COURT
2525 Grant Ave.
Ogden,UT 84401
Paul Olds
OGDEN CITY ATTORNEY
2525 Grant Ave., 1st Floor
Ogden,UT 84401
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